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Abstract 
This paper summarizes the arguments and counterarguments within the scientific discussion on the central 
bank independence and central bank transparency interaction. he main purpose of the research is to define the 
substantial relationships between central banks' independence and transparency based on scientific research 
results. Systematization literary sources and approaches for the definition of central banks independence and 
transparency indicate that there is no generalized approach to the hierarchy of these concepts. Existing 
empirical studies have shown that the independence and transparency of the central bank can be interconnected 
components to increase the effectiveness and flexibility to solve tasks regarding the provision of currency 
stability and financial stability in general. Methodological tools of the research methods are Google Trends 
and VOSviewer instruments. The presented results of an empirical analysis of trends regarding the dynamics 
of the search query number by the keywords "central bank independence" and "central bank transparency" 
show a decrease from 2004 to the present, with a significant predominance of central bank independence over 
transparency throughout the study period. The results of bibliometric analysis of keyword coincidence while 
writing scientific articles show that researchers of the central bank independence very rarely link its solution 
with the transparency aspects study, while researchers of central bank transparency often study this problem 
in direct connection with their independence analysis. Along with this, the issues of transparency of central 
banks are often studied simultaneously with the analysis of their independence. The research empirically 
confirms and theoretically proves that the central bank's independence is the primary category that creates the 
conditions for the study of its transparency. The study results provide a scientific ground to study the strength 
and direction of the relationship between the levels of transparency and independence of the central bank, 
identifying quantitative indicators to describe these relationships and can be useful for further research to 
ensure the central bank efficiency. 
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Introduction 
Trends in democratization and informatization of society necessitate the growth of publicity of processes in all 
spheres of the state governance. Given the significant level of interconnectedness of economic processes in all 
fields of the national economy and the decisive role of the banking system in ensuring economic development, 
disclosure of economic information on banking regulation is a prerequisite for improving the financial planning 
of real sector entities, financial institutions and households long-term financial stability and a prerequisite for 
progressive economic development. Besides, increasing the level of publicity and transparency minimizes the 
possibility of political influence on the decisions of the central bank, which allows it to maintain the appropriate 
level of its de facto independence and form a positive perception in society. Thus, an essential area in the study 
of the effectiveness of banking regulation is to determine the role of independence and transparency of the 
central bank. Thus, the study of the essential and substantive relationships between the categories of "central 
bank independence" and "central bank transparency" becomes relevant. It enables to form a basis to 
substantiate the causal relationships between them. 
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Literature Review  
Central bank development trends show a close relationship between their independence and transparency. 
Thus, some authors consider transparency as a component of central bank independence. Therefore, Fouad et 
al. (2019) proposed the composition of the elements of the de jure and de facto indices of independence of the 
central bank, which includes indicators of transparency and accountability. On the other hand, transparency is 
a condition for increasing the independence of the central bank and relates to an increase in its accountability 
level, which allows to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy (Dincer and Eichengreen, 2014). 
On the other hand, scholar Šmídková (2013) considers three components of ensuring an effective institutional 
environment for central banks: independence, transparency and accountability. Each of these concepts has its 
measures, functional purpose and components. At the same time, there are closer links between transparency 
and accountability, the causal nature of which also remains unclear (Dumiter, 2014). 
The need for comprehensive development of independence and transparency of central banks is also evidenced 
by the main types of these categories, identified by researchers. Thus, the central bank transparency index 
developed by Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) includes five main components: political transparency 
(characterizes the level of openness of central bank policy objectives); economic transparency (related to 
access to economic information used by the central bank for decision-making); procedural transparency 
(concerning the disclosure of the basic approaches and rules of monetary policy implementation); transparency 
of monetary policy (characterizes the disclosure of policy decisions, as well as forecast parameters); 
operational transparency (reflection of the level of results achieved during the implementation of the monetary 
policy of the central bank). 
Along with this, Balls et al. (2018) define the central bank's political and operational independence. Political 
independence means the absence of opportunities for political influence on the central bank. The authors 
suppose that operational independence should be considered the autonomy of the central bank in the formation 
and implementation of monetary policy. Ivanovich (2014) demonstrates a broader approach, distinguishing 
four types of central bank independence: functional (related to the freedom to choose the goals of monetary 
policy); institutional (independent choice of monetary policy instruments and specifics of their application); 
personal (characterizes the peculiarities of the formation of the central bank management); financial 
(independence of the central bank from the budget and the ban on financing the budget by the central bank). 
This context indicates the need to identify a set of causal relationships that arise between the independence 
and transparency of central banks. 
Crowe and Meade (2007) argue that the independence and transparency of the central bank are important for 
effective governance and are complementary concepts. Thus, the growth of central bank independence is 
associated with lower inflation, while increasing transparency contributes to improving the quality of inflation 
forecasts. Other scholars analyze the independence and transparency of central banks as separate categories. 
Thus, independence is associated with the central bank's freedom to choose its own tactics and monetary policy 
tools. At the same time, transparency characterizes the central bank's willingness to take public responsibility 
for its decisions (Bernanke, 2010). However, there is a certain specificity regarding the connection of these 
categories with other aspects of the development of central banks. For example, the independence and 
transparency of the central bank are determinants of inflation in the country. At the same time, transparency is 
characterized by a close connection with the level of depth of the country's financial markets and the strength 
of political institutions, while for the independence of central banks, such a connection is not found. 
In terms of determining the relationship between the categories of independence and transparency, one should 
pay attention to the recommended values for their level. Thus, most studies confirm that the independence of 
the central bank should reach the highest possible level. On the other hand, it is worth paying attention to the 
position of the authors who justify the need to determine the optimal level of transparency of the central bank, 
taking into account the fact that too high its level leads to information overload and may lead to growing 
uncertainty in the private sector policies that affect their own forecasts. An empirical study in the context of 
quality assurance of inflation forecasts at different levels of central bank transparency confirmed the authors' 
hypothesis and justified the need for an optimal level of transparency at which society has sufficient access to 
general information, while certain specific data that can be interpreted differently, and, accordingly, to 
determine the growth of uncertainty, should be kept in closed access (van der Cruijsen et al., 2010). 
Lustenberger and Rossi (2017) confirm that the central bank's independence and transparency have a similar 
effect on the quality of macroeconomic and financial forecasts. Besides, empirically, the transparency of the 
central bank, along with its independence, has a stimulating effect in terms of achieving the central bank 
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(Próchniak and Szyszko, 2019). A review of the scientific literature has shown that the transparency and 
independence of central banks positively affect the quality of central bank management functions and the 
effectiveness of the monetary policy. Empirical studies have shown that the impact of increasing transparency 
and independence of central banks can have a positive complementary effect on the achievement of central 
bank policy targets. At the same time, the relationship between the categories of central bank independence 
and transparency remains unclear. 
Methodology and Results 
At the first stage of the study, we will analyze the scientific interest in the categories of "central bank 
independence" and "central bank transparency", which has formed in recent years in the world community. 
We use the Google Trends toolkit, which estimates the number of search queries in the Google system as a 
whole in the world and by region. The results of this analysis are presented by Fig. 1. The total number of 
queries in the world during the maximum available period was selected to determine the generalized trends for 
analysis. From the data of the figure, we can conclude that there is a gradual reduction of scientific interest in 
the study of these two categories during the research period. 
 
Figure 1. The results of the analysis of the popularity of searches "central bank independence" and "central bank 
transparency" using Google Trends tools for the period 2004-2020 
Source: Own calculations by Google Trends tool 
Thus, the most considerable attention of researchers was paid to the search for information during 2004-2006. 
At this time, the conceptual provisions of the independence and transparency of central banks were intensively 
formed. Despite the relative reduction in the number of requests in the following years, it should be noted that 
a certain average annual level was maintained in 2010-2020 research. At the same time, the dynamic search 
trends of the two categories are characterized by significant coincidence. It leads to the preliminary conclusion 
that studies of central bank independence are the primary category, while the transparency of the central bank 
is a derivative concept formed as a result of the development of the idea of ensuring the independence of the 
central bank.  
The next step is to conduct a deeper analysis of the relationships between these categories that have emerged 
in preparing research in the world. We first analyze the scientific articles that were devoted to the study of 
central bank independence. The sample is made up of more than 700 articles indexed by the Scopus database, 
in which the words "central bank independence" are contained in the title, abstract or keywords of the paper. 
The tool of the analysis is the VOSviewer software, the application of which allows to determine the 
coincidence of keywords that occur simultaneously when writing articles related to the research of different 
aspects of central bank transparency. The results of the study are shown in Fig. 2. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
1
.2
0
0
4
0
7
.2
0
0
4
0
1
.2
0
0
5
0
7
.2
0
0
5
0
1
.2
0
0
6
0
7
.2
0
0
6
0
1
.2
0
0
7
0
7
.2
0
0
7
0
1
.2
0
0
8
0
7
.2
0
0
8
0
1
.2
0
0
9
0
7
.2
0
0
9
0
1
.2
0
1
0
0
7
.2
0
1
0
0
1
.2
0
1
1
0
7
.2
0
1
1
0
1
.2
0
1
2
0
7
.2
0
1
2
0
1
.2
0
1
3
0
7
.2
0
1
3
0
1
.2
0
1
4
0
7
.2
0
1
4
0
1
.2
0
1
5
0
7
.2
0
1
5
0
1
.2
0
1
6
0
7
.2
0
1
6
0
1
.2
0
1
7
0
7
.2
0
1
7
0
1
.2
0
1
8
0
7
.2
0
1
8
0
1
.2
0
1
9
0
7
.2
0
1
9
0
1
.2
0
2
0
F
re
q
u
en
cy
 
Central bank independence Central bank transparency
Business Ethics and Leadership, Volume 4, Issue 2, 2020   
ISSN (online) – 2520-6311; ISSN (print) – 2520-6761 
112 
 
Figure 2. The results of the analysis of the keywords co-occurrence in Scopus papers related with "central bank 
independence" investigation using VOS viewer tools 
Source: Own calculations by VOSviewer tool 
The research tools enable us to distinguish different categories, the closeness of which occurs due to the 
frequency of coincidence of each of the two concepts in the list of keywords in a particular study. Besides, the 
frequency of occurrence and the combination of individual keywords allows you to identify clusters that 
include concepts that are most often jointly studied by scientists. The size of the circle for each concept 
illustrates the frequency of its occurrence in the total sample. Thus, most often the work devoted to the study 
of central bank independence also concerns the investigation of monetary policy and inflation. At the same 
time, the analysis of the composition of clusters formed by groups of keywords is a subject of considerable 
scientific interest. At this stage of the study, eight clusters were formed, each of them includes from 8 to 3 words 
(Table 1). The category "central bank independence" is included in cluster 3, which contains 7 keywords. It should 
be noted that the content of the concepts included in this cluster illustrate the goals that can be achieved directly 
or indirectly as a result of increasing central bank independence (governance, economic growth) or the 
conditions enhancing the role of central bank independence einsuring (globalization, global financial crisis). 
Table 1. The results of analysis of the cluster items of keywords co-occurrence in Scopus papers related with 
"central bank independence" investigation 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
Democracy 
Economic policy 
Empirical analysis 
Financial system 
Monetary institutions 
Policy making 
Political business cycle 
Unemployment 
Delegation 
Financial crisis 
Financial stability 
Inflation targeting 
Monetary policy 
Price stability 
Unconventional monetary 
policy 
Central bank independence 
Economic growth 
Federal reserve 
Global financial crisis 
Globalization 
Governance 
Panel data 
Banking 
Currency 
Developing countries 
Exchange rate 
Fiscal policy 
Institutional quality 
Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 
Credibility 
Disinflation 
Institutions 
Openness 
Sacrifice ratio 
Accountability 
Institutional reform 
Seigniorage 
Transitional economy 
Transparency 
Inflation bias 
Macroeconomics 
Political business cycle 
Political economy 
Budget deficit 
Inflation 
National economy 
Source: Own calculations by VOSviewer tool 
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On the other hand, the category of “central bank transparency” was included in cluster 6, along with the concept 
of accountability, as well as categories that indicate the importance of ensuring the transparency of the central 
bank in the context of transformations (transitional economy, institutional reform). At the same time, such a 
division does not suggest that central bank transparency is a necessary aspect that must be explored when 
studying central bank independence. 
On the other hand, there is a fairly close relationship between cluster 3 and cluster 2. Given the fact that cluster 2 
includes categories which the central bank should take into account (price stability, inflation targeting, 
financial stability etc.) or confront (financial crisis), it is quite natural and shows that the independence of the 
central bank is not a target category, but a basic one, which creates conditions for increasing its efficiency in 
achieving the final goals of central bank functioning. 
This stage of the study did not allow us to definitively substantiate the substantive relationship between the 
categories of independence and transparency of central banks. That is why we will conduct a similar study of 
the composition of keywords in articles focused on the study of transparency of central banks. The sample of 
scientific articles on this topic included in the Scopus database is about 150 publications. The results of the 
analysis of the composition of keywords using the VOSviewer toolkit are presented by Fig. 3. 
 
Figure 3. The results of the analysis of the keywords co-occurrence in Scopus papers related with "central bank 
transparency" investigation using VOSviewer tools 
Source: Own calculations by VOSviewer tool 
The results obtained at this stage show that the most common in research next to the category of "central bank 
transparency" are monetary policy and inflation, which are similar to previous results and are quite natural, 
given the basic conceptual framework of the central bank. At the same time, attention should be paid to the 
cluster structure of keywords identified in central bank transparency studies (Table 2).  
Unlike the previous stage, within this block, the transparency and independence of the central bank belong to 
the same cluster. Besides, this cluster includes the concepts of financial stability, information asymmetry and 
uncertainty, which indicates the maximum effectiveness of the interaction of independence and transparency 
of the central bank in combating financial and information risks. Cluster 2, which includes market indicators 
of the banking system and methods used in monetary policy, is close to this cluster. 
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Table 2. The results of analysis of the cluster items of keywords co-occurrence in Scopus papers related 
with "central bank transparency" investigation 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
Asymmetric information 
Central bank independence 
Central bank transparency 
Financial stability 
Panel data 
Uncertainty 
Wage setting 
Central bank communications 
Emerging markets 
Forecasting method 
Inflation targeting 
Interest rates 
Monetary policy 
Fiscal policy 
Inflation 
Interest rate 
Monetary union 
Unemployment 
Communication 
Source: Own calculations by VOSviewer tool 
It should be noted that in the study of central bank transparency, the categories of independence and 
transparency of the central bank fall into one cluster, while in a similar analysis, the categories of "central bank 
independence" belong to different clusters. This allows us to conclude that the independence of the central 
bank is the primary category, which, in turn, creates the basis for research and development of transparency of 
the central bank. 
Conclusions, Discussion and Recommendations  
The study showed that there are close substantive and practical links between the categories of "central bank 
independence" and "central bank transparency". Existing empirical studies have shown that the independence 
and transparency of the central bank can serve as tools to increase the effectiveness of its main goals, such as 
price or financial stability, or become complementary components in improving the quality of the central 
bank's core tasks. A preliminary analysis of trends in the study of central bank independence and central bank 
transparency showed a declining trend in search queries from 2004 to the present, with a significant 
predominance of central bank independence over transparency throughout the study period. The results of 
bibliometric analysis of the coincidence of keywords in scientific articles devoted to the study of independence 
and transparency of the central bank, showed that the investigations of central bank independence concern the 
study of aspects of its transparency in a limited number of cases. Along with this, the central bank transparency 
is often studied simultaneously with the analysis of their independence. It enables to determine that the 
independence of the central bank is the primary category that creates the conditions for the study of its 
transparency. Obtained results provide a scientific basis for studying the strength and direction of the 
relationship between the levels of transparency and independence of the central bank, measured as quantitative 
indicators. 
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